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## Viewing cable 08RIYADH1114, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORK PROGRESSES IN RIYADH

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#08RIYADH1114**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">08RIYADH1114</a>	<a href="#">2008-07-19 09:43</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">SECRET</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Riyadh</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/13/115715/wikileaks-cables-show-worry-about.html>

VZCZCXRO1560  
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR  
DE RUEHRH #1114/01 2010943  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 190943Z JUL 08  
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8818  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0229  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFIS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001114

SIPDIS

P FOR U/S WBURNS  
NEA FOR DAS GGRAY

DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, MWILLIAMSON, GPERSON,  
AND JHART  
S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN, SUSAN BURK, GAIL ROBERTSON, AND  
BAVERILL  
DS/ATA FOR KMALOY  
TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY  
DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT  
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2018

TAGS: [KCIP](#) [EPET](#) [ENERG](#) [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [SA](#)

SUBJECT: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORK PROGRESSES IN RIYADH

REF: SECSTATE 70793

Classified By: DCM Michael Gfoeller for  
reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d).

¶1. (U) This cable has been cleared by  
DOE A/S Kevin Kolevar.

¶2. (S) During a July 8 visit to Riyadh, DOE A/S Kevin Kolevar met with Ministry of Interior representatives Joint Working Group (JWG) on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Co-Chair Dr. Saud A-Semari and Dr. Khalid Al-Ageel, Manager, High Commission on Industrial Security. The U.S. JWG Co-Chair Economic Counselor Robert Murphy participated, as did a delegation from DOE and the Embassy. Major outcomes of the discussions included:

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Abqaiq Assessment to Move Forward  
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¶3. (S) Dr. Al-Semari told us the Saudis are now ready to move forward with a complete Vulnerability Assessment (VA) of Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq Plants. We are scheduling a visit by DOE and Sandia Lab personnel for early August to conduct the VA. This is a key win for the Joint Working Group. DOE's Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability is able to finance the VA, as we meanwhile work to finalize procedures for future Saudi financing of bilateral CIP efforts under the May 2008 Technical Cooperation Agreement signed by Secretary Rice.

--Background to Abqaiq Plants: Abqaiq is the world's single largest petroleum processing and de-sulphurization facility. About 70% of Saudi crude production passes through Abqaiq for processing. The facility is critical to the world's petroleum markets. It has a through-put capacity of 7 million-plus barrel per day (bpd) capacity, of which 6.3 mbpd are routinely utilized.

--The VA is an in-depth, technical review of the facility's operational and security systems. The VA includes a 2-week on-site data collection and discussion period, followed by a month-long data analysis period. A Sandia National Labs team will analyze Abqaiq data utilizing its VA computer models. The Saudi MOI would receive VA results and recommendations within about one month after completion of the on-site data collection. JWG members regard successful completion of the VA as one of our highest priorities, and a template for facility-based work in the future.

--We are particularly concerned to identify Abqaiq components which were custom-manufactured several decades ago, in the 1970s, and for which Saudi Aramco may have no replacements or spare parts. Such single-point failures would be of grave concern. Saudi Aramco personnel have not been able to provide a clear picture of these vulnerabilities during past

short visits to Abqaiq by JWG personnel. An in-depth analysis of Abqaiq's engineering plans and drawings, along with extended access to and discussion with key technical personnel, are required to better understand the plant's specific vulnerabilities.

--The VA also will help us to better advise the MOI and Saudi Aramco on how to design security systems to protect Abqaiq, and for contingency planning to prepare for any possible attack on the facility. Such planning would allow Saudi Aramco and the MOI to better mitigate long-term damage, ensure maximum possible continuity of operations, and respond and recover as swiftly as possible.

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MOI Requests Threat Warning System Assistance  
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¶4. (C) The MOI had expressed an interest in adopting a national threat warning system, and had requested a briefing on systems in use in the U.S. During the July 8 meeting, DOE Infrastructure System Analyst VanderMey therefore presented on U.S. threat warning systems, including DHS's Homeland Security Advisory System and the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security System (MARSEC). Our MOI interlocutors were particularly impressed to learn how the USG works with industry in implementing the threat warning system, sharing information on an as-needed basis, and even sponsoring some industry personnel for security clearances so that information could be better shared. The group also discussed the utility of restricting a specific threat warning to a given region, city, or industrial sector.

¶5. (C) Dr. Saud-Al Semari requested the USG make available one employee who is familiar with the U.S. threat warning systems for a 6-12 month period to assist the MOI in implementing a similar system for Saudi Arabia. A/S Kolevar stated that he believed he could work with DHS or DOE to make such a person available, although perhaps for a shorter, more focused period of time.

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MOI Proposes Intelligence Liaison Offices with Key Sectoral Ministries  
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¶6. (S) Dr. Al Semari then steered the discussion towards how the USG structured its intelligence-sharing and liaison functions for agencies such as DHS and DOE. A/S Kolevar explained that the Department of Energy had its own intelligence division, but that it largely played a liaison role with the larger intelligence services. He, Economic Counselor Murphy, and Energy Analyst Burke also explored the frequent practice of seconding personnel between departments, offices, and functions to allow for better intelligence sharing.

¶7. (S) Dr. Al-Semari stated it would be useful for the MOI to establish a liaison office within MOI to better communicate with key sectoral ministries such as the Ministry of Petroleum (MinPet) and Transportation, or alternately, seek to establish liaison offices within these ministries. He noted that while the High Commission on Industrial Security (which oversees security and safety issues at parastatals such as Saudi Aramco and SABIC) had deepened ties with industry, the MOI still has no clear mechanism for working easily with other ministries. Dr. Al Semari concurred with Econ Off

that having liaison personnel imbedded in a ministry would establish a more effective, on-going relationship, which could help ensure key counterpart ministers address security issues with appropriate understanding and seriousness.

¶8. (SBU) Regarding reftel A, Economic Counselor Robert Murphy hand-delivered the letter from U/S Burns to HRH Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Nayif on July 7. 2

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Comment  
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¶9. (C) The Mission was pleased -- on two levels -- to hear Dr. Al-Semari initiate the idea of establishing an MOI intelligence liaison to improve communication with other ministries. First, it will help the MOI function and communicate better with other key ministries who require security information to address their sector's challenges. Additionally, this is the first time within the JWG that the MOI has proposed a systemic change to improve its communication with other organizations. We have spent the last two years working closely with the MOI, encouraging them to coordinate and communicate with other parts of the government and industry on security issues. The MOI now appears to be thinking deeply and independently about how to apply these lessons to its own environment in a manner appropriate to Saudi norms. This is a small but we hope significant harbinger of progress to come.

FRAKER